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I.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case presents a boundary line dispute between owners of fann land in Clearwater
County, Idaho. The plaintiffs (Mareks) recently had the disputed boundary surveyed ru1d the
result was a line significantly east of where their neighbors; the defendants (Lawrences)
understood the line to be---cutting off a section of ground they had cultivated for several decades.
The boundary in dispute (the south 1/4 of the section line between Section 26 and Section 27,
Township 38N, Rangel W, B.M.) was created when R.C. Johnson, a prior common owner of
both Marcks' and Lawrences' parcels as a contiguous tract, divided the property with a Warranty
Deed he prepared himself. The legal description of the property he conveyed to Marcks'
predecessor, Laura Adamson (Gayle Marek's mother); an approximately 20 acre parcel in said
Section 26, was interpreted by the Court below to state the location of the intended boundary
line, which contro lied regardless of the surveyed location of the Section line.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The original complaint was filed by the Mareks against the Lawrenccs to seek declaration
of two separate common boundaries between the parties, referred to by them as the "Secti'on 27"
dispute and the "Three Bear Road" dispute. Complaint, R pp. 177-179, p. 4, L. 1-p. 6, L. 14.
After an evidentiary hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction the court ruled in
favor of the Lawrences as to the location of the "Section 27° boundary line; consistent with a
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long existing fence line and ordered the Mareks' to replace the old fence pending final resolution.
Thereafter in the proceedings, the Mareks' asserted only their claim to the Three Bear Road
surveyed boundary line~that is ownership of property up to that line.
The Lawrences filed a motion for summary judgment on its claim of adverse possession
and boundary by agreement. Judge Bradbury denied the motion, ruling there was no adverse
possession after finding occupation by the Lawrences was not "open, notorious and hostile"
because the parties either preswned the line of occupation by the Lawrences was the true
boundary line or there was a boundary line agreement between the predecessors to the parties.
Memorandum Decision and Order dated May 27, 2009, R 154-159.
The Lawrences filed a second motion for summary judgment, arguing there was no
question of fact as to boundary by agreement, resolving the location of the Three Bear Road
boundary consistent with intent of parties to the agreement; predecessors in interest to the
Mareks and Lawrences.
Judge Bradbury denied the second motion for summary judgment after finding questions
of fact existed as to whether there was an implied boundary by agreement between predecessors
to the parties. Memorandum Decision and Order dated Sept. 27, 2010, R pp.55-62. On motion
for reconsideration, Judge Bradbury ruled there was no question of fact as to the location of the
intended boundary line, which controlled no matter where a survey might place the section line
between said Sections 26 and 27. Memorandum Decision and Order dated Nov. 22, 2010, R pp.
26-32.
Judge Bradbury retired prior to entering judgment pursuant to his order and his successor,
Judge Griffin entered judgment for the Lawrences, decreeing the location of both disputed
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boundaries, and awarding litigation costs. The Mareks' have appealed the judgment only as it
pertains to the Three Bear Road disputed boundary.
The judgment prepared and entered by Judge Grifiin was an attempt to clearly state the
boundary intended by R.C. Johnson: "From a point in the center of Three Bear Road on the eastwest running south boundary line of the Lawrences' property described above ... thence north to
the intersection with the east-west center section line of Section 26, .. .less the easement for Three
Bear Road.". Amended Judgment, R pp. 18-20.

III.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

Three near Road was originally named Hays Road and came to be a public highway by
petition dated May 2, 1889. The road, including the subject section of road, running from the
south section comer common to Sections 26 and 27 at its southern point, to the 1/4 section corner
common to Sections 26 and 27 at its northern point, was surveyed by the county surveyor, W.R.
Bell and the survey was made part of the petition. The Bell survey plat shows the road running
north from the south section line on the section line common to Sections 26 and 27 to the
common north 1/4 corner, where it jogs to the west, then back east to the section line. R p. 123
(Exhibit A to Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment.)
However, this was not where the road was built. The road looped we.11 to the west at a
point just south of the disputed 1/4 comer around a ridge then back to the north/south section line
north of the disputed corner, where it again proceeded north on or near the section line.
We know from a comparison of aerial photos; one taken around 1949; the other recently',
1

Exhibits "A", "B", Affidavit of R.C. Johnson, R pp. 94, 95.
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along with the affidavits of Clinton Frederickson and R.C. Johnson ( R pp. 89-101), that the road
was modified near the disputed north 1/4 comer sometime between 1972 and 1974. To
straighten the north-south running road, it was necessary to drill, blast and excavate a gentle eastwest running ridge so as to build the new section of road at roughly the same grade as the road to
the south of this point. Affidavit of Clinton Frederickson. (Clearwater County road employee) R
pp. 102-107.
In 1974, Wayne Johnson owned the property in Sections 26 and 27 on both sides of Three

Bear Road. The Clearwater County Road Superintendent Wayne Johnson asked to execute a
"RIGHT OF WAY DEED" with a description of two rectangular parcels 60 feet wide by a total
of 1320 feet long. The description of the northern rectangle calls from the 1/4 comer common to
Sections 26 and 27 to a point of beginning 20 feet West of said comer, then continues to describe
a 60 foot wide by 300 foot long rectangle at an angle 9.5 degrees East of South. The southern
parcel is described as a 60 foot wide by 1021 foot rectangle with 30 feet lying on each side of the
Section line common to Sections 26 and 272 • R pp. 99-100.
By describing the location of the 60 foot wide right of way for the newly located Three
Bear Road, as being a specific distance from the disputed 1/4 comer common to sections 26 and
27, and assuming the existing road bed was in the center of the right of way, the described
location of that comer can be determined today by measuring 50 feet east of the center of the
road bed. R.C. Johnson recalls a cement monument in a location consistent with the Right of
Way Deed-50 feet east of road center. Affidavit R.C. Johnson, p. 2, par. 4, R p. 90.
In 1985, R.C. Johnson, grantee of the contiguous tract (Marek and Lawrence property)

2

See, Exhibits "D", "E", "F", Affidavit ofR. C. Johnson, R pp. 97-100.
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from his father Wayne, conveyed to Laura Adamson the approximately 20 acres immediately
west of Three Bear Road in Section 27, the east boundary of which is now in dispute. The legal
description on the Warranty Deed 3 reads as follows:
"Sec 27, 38N, 1W, El/2NESE, Less the S 36', and less 1.06 AC
Road Right of Way in Sec 27, Recorded No. 108078."

In 1985 Earl Lawrence was leasing the Section 26 ground east of Three Bear road from

R.C. Johnson and cultivated it up to the boundary line he now asserts-parallel to Three Bear
Road to a point near the north end of the property where the road turns to the west. From that
point north, the cultivation line, if extended, would contact the north boundary line at or near a
point 50 feet west of the center of Three Bear Road. 4 In 1998 the Lawrences purchased the
Section 26 property (Nl/2SW1/4) from R.C. Johnson with that aliquot part description. 5
In 2005 the Mareks hired a surveyor who located the subject north 1/4 comer common to
said Sections 26 c.mc.l 27 significantly east of the cultivation line. R.C. Johnson attested that the
access driveway from Three Bear Road to property now owned by the Mareks (adjacent and
north of the subject Lawrence property in Section 26) lies east of where he believed the disputed
l/4 corner to be. 6

3

Exhibit "G", Affidavit ofR. C. Johnson, R. 101.

4

The cultivation line arcs to the east around an existing primitive driveway exiting Three
Bear Road near the north end of the disputed boundary. See, Affidavit of R. C. Johnson, R pp. 9096 and Exhibit "C", thereto.
5

A warranty deed with the same description from Johnson to the Lawrences was
recorded in 2006. This is not in dispute.
6

Johnson said this road was used by predecessors to the Mareks with his permission.
This is a secondary access to the property from Three Bear Road. Affidavit ofR. C. Johnson, p.
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If the disputed north 1/4 comer is determined to be on the survey line, the Mareks will
own the ground crossed by the driveway from Three Bear Road and a triangle shaped parcel of
ground historically cultivated by the Lawrences. If the 1/4 corner is determined to be consistent
with the Right of Way Deed from Wayne Johnson to Clearwater County and where R.C Johnson
attested he understood the comer to be when he conveyed to Laura Adamson, the Lawrences will
own the ground up to the approximate cultivation line, including the ground crossed by the
driveway.
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court below first denied the Lawrences' motion for summary judgment
based upon a conclusion that the deed from R.C. Johnson to Laura Adamson could be interpreted
more than one way and questions of fact existed as to the intention of those parties to the
transaction. The court reconsidered this decision and found the affidavits in support and
opposition to summary judgment left no question of fact as to the intended location of the
disputed boundary created when R.C. Johnson divided the 100 acre tract by his description of the
20 acres he conveyed to Laura Adamson in 1985.
In construing the record on a motion for summary judgment, all
reasonable inferences and conclusions must be drawn in favor of
the party opposing summary judgment.All doubts are to be
resolved against the moving paiiy. The nonmoving party, however,
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or otherwise must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine
issue of fact. The evidence offered in support of or in opposition

3,4, par. 10., Rpp. 91, 92.
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to a motion for summary judgment must be admissible.
When questions of law are presented on a motion for summary
j udgmenl, this Court exercises free review and is not bound by
findings of the district court but is free to draw its own conclusions
from the evidence presented .. Thus, the Court independently
reviews the trial court's resolution of whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists and whether the prevailing party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. If uncontroverted facts exist which
lead to a definite disposition as a matter oflaw, summary judgment
is appropriate. (Citations omitted).

Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841,216 P.3d 130 (Idaho 2009).

V.

ISSUE ON APPEAL
The Mareks do not argue questions of material fact exist in this case. They
contend the Johnson to Adamson deed is unambiguous and the grantor's intent as to the location
of the boundary line created by that deed should be determined solely from the language of the
deed. To consider extrinsic evidence was error by the lower court.
At issue is whether the court may consider evidence other than the language of the legal
description on this deed to determine the intent of the parties (Johnson/ Adamson) as to location
of the disputed boundary. And if so, whether the evidence of record leaves no question of
material fact as to the disputed boundary line being where Johnson and Adamson intended it to
be.
Also at issue is whether this appeal was frivolous and lacked merit sufficient to allow an
award of attorney fees and costs on appeal as stated in lC § 12-121.
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VI..
ARGUMENT

As population of North Central Idaho increases, long existing tracts of rural land are now
being divided. In some part due to the accuracy of modem equipment, surveyors are identifying
boundary lines in locations at odds with long enduring occupation and use. Boundary law in
Idaho has evolved to favor the owner who occupies, cultivates or improves property up to a line
for a long period of time. Where a survey establishes a line inconsistent with usage, there must
be an explanation. It is undisputed in this case that occupation and usage sprung from an
understanding, which may also have been a mutual misunderstanding, of the location of the
section line between Sections 26 and 27.
A.

Deed Construction/Mutual Mistake

If the Johnson to Adamson deed were to be construed literally, two parcels of ground 60

feet wide in Section 27 arguably now belong to R.C. Johnson 7 in a location east of the Three
Bear Road right of way. The legal description of the property conveyed to Adamson included
the provision, "less the 1.06 Ac Road Right of Way in Sec 27 Recorded No 108078". The
description of the strip of ground stated in said Right of Way Deed (No. 108078) calls from the
disputed 1/4 comer and would place the strip in the Lawrences' wheat field if the surveyed
comer controls. (See, Illustration, R p. 74, and Compare, Drawing by R.C. Johnson, R p. 97.)
On its face this legal description is unambiguous. It is the survey which created the

7

R.C. Johnson's father conveyed the Right Of Way Deed to Clearwater County by
instrument recorded when he held only a life estate in the property. R.C Johnson was the
remainderman. If the Wayne Johnson to Clearwater County Right of Way Deed expired on
Wayne's death, R.C. Johnson is now the owner.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

8

anomaly described above. When the description is placed on the ground it does not comport with
the road center or the crop line extended. 8
The tendency of modem decisions is to disregard technicalities and
to treat all uncertainties in a conveyance as ambiguities subject to
be cleared up by resort to the intention of the parties as gathered
from the instrument itself, the circumstances attending and leading
up to its execution, and the subject matter and the situation of the
parties as of that time.
In Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82, 245 P.2d 1052 (1952) an
uncertain point of beginning rendered the deed ambiguous. There,
as here, the use of a seemingly unambiguous description led to
problems locating the parcel on the ground. Such uncertainty
creates ambiguity.

Allen v. Boydstun, 111 Idaho 188, 722 P.2d 497 (Idaho App. 1986).
lt was the intent of R.C. Jolmson in 1985 to divide his property on the section line

between Section 26 and 27. The location of the north comer of this line was identified in the
deed to Adamson, by reference to a prior recorded Right of Way Deed, as being 50 feet east of
the center of Three Bear Road. And according to his un-refuted Affidavit, a concrete monument
marked the corner at that time. lf the survey here is accurate, the paiiies to the JohnsonAdamson conveyance were mistaken as to the location of the subject section line. The disputed
boundary line should be reformed to reflect the intent of the paiiies. Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho
636, 671 P.2d 1099 (Idaho App. 1983).

8

In his affidavit Frank Marek asse1is the crop line does not extend to the north boundary,
but follows the east arc line of the access road. R.C. Johnson explains the crop line if extended
would correspond with his recollection of the location of the disputed corner; also in line with
the Mareks' north-south fence running from that point to the north. See, Affidavit c~f R. C
Johnson ( and Exhibit "C" thereto) R pp. 90-96).
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B.

Boundary by Agreement

Property owners have historically agreed on the location of a boundary line between their
properties when there has been no survey and they are uncertain as to the exact location of the
line.
The agreement establishing a boundary may be express or implied
from the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties ...
Allowing adjoining landowner, without objection, to build
improvements on the property is also evidence of an agreement.
The period of acquiescence need not continue f<)f the amount of
time necessary to establish adverse possession because
acquiescence is merely competent evidence of the agreement.

Trappe ft v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 532, 633 P .2d 592, 597 (1981 ).
Furthermore, we recently held that ignorance as to what is later
deemed the true boundary constitutes the requisite uncertainty.
Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho at 41, 794 P.2d at 630
Morrissey v. Haley, 124 ldaho 870, 873, 865 P.2d 961, 965 (Idaho 1993)
Most reported cases of boundary by agreement in Idaho arose from an implied agreement;
use on one side of a line and acquiescence to such use by the owner on the other side of a line
evidenced by a physical monument. A farming line has been held to be a sufficient monument.
Grfffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397, 34 P.3d 1080 (Idaho 2001).
But here, the court need not consider the possibility that Lawrence's use and Marek's
acquiescence was a product of convenience, not agreement, because the usage was consistent
with an express boundary agreement. The legal description in the 1985 deed to Adamson,
dividing R.C. Johnson's contiguous tract referred to a separate recorded instrument to identify
the location of Three Bear Road. Laura Adamson (or any subsequent owner) could refer to that
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instrument and locate the disputed corner by measuring 50 feet east of the road center on a line
with her north boundary line running east and west.
A description contained in a deed will be sufficient so long as
quantity, identity or boundaries of property can be determined from
the face of the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic evidence to
which it refers.

Haney v. Molko, 123 Idaho 132, 844 P.2d 1382 (Ct.App.1992).
Although they were possibly mistaken as to the true location of the section line dividing
their properties, R.C. Johnson and Laura Adamson agreed on the location of their boundary. And
the northern most point of that agreed boundary line was 50 feet east of the center of Three Bear
Road.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Affidavit of R.C. Johnson, presented admissible evidence that Clearwater County
asked his father to execute a right of way deed conveying a 60 food wide strip of ground to the
county to reflect a realignment of Three Bear Road. The legal description of this strip called a
point of beginning being a certain distance and bearing from the 1/4 comer now in dispute.
According to the Affidavit of R.C. Johnson, this road right of way description was consistent
with his understanding of the location of the disputed 1/4 comer, then evidenced by a concrete
monument. He further attested that he and Laura Adamson agreed on that corner (50 feet east of
road center) as the north point of the boundary line between the 20 acres he sold to her and the 80
acres he retained and later sold to the Lawrences.
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Again, we emphasize that the purpose of summary judgment
proceedings is to eliminate the necessity of trial where facts are not
in dispute and where existent and undisputed facts lead to a
conclusion oflaw which is certain. Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho
337, 563 P.2d 395 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891, 98 S.Ct. 266,
54 L.Ed.2d 177 (1977); Jacobsen v. State, 89 Wash.2d 104, 569
P.2d 1152 (1977); see Hackin v. Rupp, 9 Ariz.App. 354, 452 P.2d
519 (1969). If a party resists summary judgment, it is his
responsibility to place in the record before the trial court the
existence of controverted material facts which require resolution by
trial. A party may not rely on his pleadings nor merely assert that
there are some facts which might or will support his legal theory,
but rather he must establish the existence of those facts by
deposition, affidavit, or otherwise. Failure to so establish the
existence of controverted material facts exposes a party to the risk
of a summary judgment. We hold that such is the case here.
Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441, 690 P .2d 896 (Idaho 1984)

Here, the Mareks have presented no evidence of the intent of R.C. Johnson and Laura
Adamson which would support placing the disputed boundary line in a location consistent with
their survey-through the cultivated field. They rely solely on their assertion that the JohnsonAdamson deed was and is unambiguous. This argument essentially asks the court to stTictly
construe the first part of the legal description on the deed and ignore "less the 1.06 Ac ... "
The description of"Boundary Number Two" in Judge Griffin's Judgment calls for a line
running due north from its southern most point at the center of Three Bear Road. This may not
result in the north comer of the disputed line being at a point consistent with the location
identified in the 1985 deed from R.C. Johnson to Laura Adamson and the Affidavit of R.C.
Johnson. The Respondents respectfully ask this court to affirm the District Court's decision in
favor of the Lawrences and remand the case with instructions to revise the judgment to state the
undisputed south corner of the boundary between the subject properties of the respective parties
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is the center of Three Bear Road on a line with the south boundaries of the properties and the
north comer is 50 feet east of center of Three Bear Road on a line with the north boundaries of
the properties.
The Lawrences further claim the additional attorney fees they have incurred to protect
their property lines in this matter resulted from a frivolous appeal and they should therefore be
awarded judgment for such expense pursuant to lC § 12-121.
DATED this

LJ,}hday of October, 2011.
I
at:~-+--~-,-'-~"-----""---"--+h=-=-Attorney for Respon ents
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